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LABOR LAW - Sex Discrimination - Equal Pay for
Equal Work Standard Not Necessary for Title VII
Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims. County of
Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
In County of Washington v. Gunther,1 the Supreme Court
held that the Bennett Amendment2 to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19643 did not require that Title VII sex-based
wage discrimination claims meet the equal work standard of
the Equal Pay Act (EPA).4
In Gunther, four female prison matrons claimed they were
paid lower wages than male prison guards. The female prison
matrons claimed that their lower wages were caused, at least
in part, by intentional sex discrimination. Their claim was
based on the fact that although the county's own internal
study determined that female prison matrons should be paid
approximately ninety-five percent as much as male prison
guards, the actual differential was about seventy percent.5
The Federal District Court for Oregon rejected the claim be-
cause the female guards' responsibilities were not equivalent
to those of the male guards." The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a Title VII claim of sex-
1. 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). The Bennett Amendment, the last sentence of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), states:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
4. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) [hereinafter cited as EPA].
5. At the time of the complaint, the pay scale for the male guards and trainees
ranged from $143.00/$176.00 (minimum) to $144.00/$224.00 (maximum) more than
the pay scale for the female prison matrons. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 788, 789 (D. Or.
1976).
6. The district court based its decision on its findings that the male guards, on a
per guard basis, supervised more than 10 times as many prisoners as did the female
guards, and that the female guards devoted much of their time to less valuable cleri-
cal duties. The court thus rejected the female guards' claim that they were paid une-
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based wage discrimination could be established without satis-
fying the EPA's equal work standard.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals and held that the four prison matrons could make a
prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII without
proving that their jobs were equal to those of their male coun-
terparts. Although the Gunther holding was narrow, and
based on a rather unique fact situation, the removal of the
equal work standard" from Title VII sex-based wage discrimi-
nation claims likely will spawn a multitude of claims under
Title VII. The Court's reliance on the broad remedial pur-
pose of Title VII indicates that a Title VII prima facie case of
sex discrimination might be established by comparing the
wages of significantly different jobs. It is uncertain, however,
how far beyond the former equal work standard the courts
will go.
I. THE STATUTES
Essentially, Gunther involved the reconciliation of Title
VII with the EPA. Congress had attempted to reconcile the
two acts by adding the Bennett Amendment to Title VII, but
the ambiguous wording of the Bennett Amendment and the
qual wages for substantially equal work. Id. at 791. The equal work decision was not
appealed.
7. 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.
1980). For further discussions of the court of appeals' decision in Gunther, see Blum-
rosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation; The Survival of a Theory, 14 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 8 nn.25 & 26 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Survival of a Theory];
Project, Annual Survey of Labor Law, 22 B.C.L. REV. 184 (1981); Note, Wage Dis-
crimination Under Title VII after IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 67 VA. L.
REV. 589, 591 (1981).
8. For a discussion of the equal work standard see text accompanying note 12
infra.
9. These claims will be in response to the significant wage differential that appar-
ently exists between men and women workers. A recent report issued by the National
Academy of Sciences found that among year-round full-time workers, the annual
earnings of white women averaged less than 60% of those of white men. NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL
VALUE (1981), summarized in 108 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 10 (Sept. 7, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES]. See generally Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen].
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lack of definitive legislative history 0 resulted in inconsistent
judicial interpretations of the Bennett Amendment's effect on
the scope of Title VII.
A. Equal Pay Act
The EPA was enacted in 1963 as an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.1- The EPA contains two
provisions relevant to a discussion of Gunther First, the EPA
is restricted to cases involving jobs which are substantially
equal.' 2 Second, the EPA contains four affirmative defenses
which justify wage differentials otherwise prohibited by the
EPA.13
The EPA was enacted, after extensive debate, to combat
sex-based wage discrimination.14 The Supreme Court in Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Brennan5 noted that "Congress' purpose
in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was per-
10. The complete legislative history of the Bennett Amendment is contained in a
brief exchange between Senators Bennett, Humphrey and Dirksen, 110 CONG. REC.
13647 (1964), and a comment by Representative Cellar, 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The relevant portion of the EPA is:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are em-
ployed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in
such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to em-
ployees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs[,] the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differ-
ential based on any other factor than sex
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
12. The equal work standard of the EPA is defined as requiring equal pay for jobs
that require equal skill, responsibility, effort and similar working conditions. See 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) and Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-200
(1974). See also Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970), where the court determined that the equal work standard
did not require that the jobs be identical, but only that they be substantially equal.
The equal work standard has also been interpreted as authorizing government inter-
vention to equalize wage differentials only when men's and women's jobs are identical
or nearly so. Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable
Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 233, 265 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Nelson, Opton & Wilson].
13. See note 11 supra and note 28 tnfra.
14. For a summary of the congressional debate on the EPA, see Gitt & Gelb, Be-
yond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protections Under Title VII,
8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 723, 734-42 (1977).
15. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
1981]
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ceived to be a serious and endemic problem of [sex-based]
employment discrimination in private industry . "16 The
object of the EPA was to eliminate employment conditions
where a woman who performed work "equal" to that per-
formed by a man was paid less merely because she was a wo-
man. 7 Thus, the EPA was designed as remedial legislation
specifically applicable to sex-based wage discrimination.
B. Title VII
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 one year af-
ter passing the Equal Pay Act. Title VII generally prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, re-
ligion and sex. Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it unlawful
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment because of the individual's sex. 8
The legislative history and judicial interpretations of Title
VII indicate that it was designed to function as broad reme-
dial legislation. The report issued by the Senate Committee
on Title VII stated that Title VII was aimed at all aspects of
discrimination. 9 The report further noted that a broad ap-
proach to the definifion of equal employment opportunity was
essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of
discrimination."0
The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,21 addressing a claim of race-based employment dis-
crinination, stated that "[t]he language of Title VII makes
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employ-
ment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified
16. Id. at 195.
17. See note 11 supra. Congress initially considered, but rejected, a comparable
work standard, and adopted an equal work for equal pay standard. See H.R. REP. No.
309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 687. See
also Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 888
(1980); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 12, at 266 & n.140.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
19. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2355.
20. Id. See note 14 supra.
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."22
The Supreme Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody13
noted that "the central statutory purposes [of Title VII] are
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and mak-
ing persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimi-
nation." '24 It is clear that Title VII is meant to combat all
forms of discrimination in employment.
C. The Bennett Amendment
Title VII initially was designed to combat racial discrimi-
nation. The sex discrimination provisions of Title VII were
added during the final days before passage of Title VII.25 Sen-
ator Bennett became concerned that the addition of the sex
discrimination provisions to Title VII might result in inconsis-
tencies between the EPA and Title VII, and stated that "the
purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of
conflicts, the provisions of the EPA shall not be nullified. ' 26
There have been two distinct interpretations as to which
EPA provisions were carried over by the Bennett Amendment
to Title VII. The pre-Gunther majority view held that the
scope of Title VII was limited to those discrimainatory claims
which could be brought under the EPA (that is, the equal
work standard must be satisfied).27 The other view held that
the Bennett Amendment did not limit the scope of Title VII,
but rather exempted only those discriminatory practices from
22. Id. at 800. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Blum-
rosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 71 MicH. L. REv. 59, 73 (1972).
23. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
24. Id. at 421.
25. Some commentators believe that Representative Smith of Virginia, who intro-
duced the amendment which added the sex discrimination provisions to the Civil
Rights Act, was not motivated by an interest in eliminating sex discrimination, but
rather hoped the sex discrimination provisions would result in the defeat of the act.
See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-11 & n.30
(1968).
26. 110 CONG. REc. 13647 (1964).
27. See Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
888 (1980); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v.




Title VII which were permitted by the EPA's four affirmative
defenses.28
II. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL WORK STANDARD TO
TITLE VII
The narrow issue in Gunther was whether the Bennett
Amendment requires the equal pay for equal work standard of
the EPA to be satisfied in order for a petitioner to establish a
prima facie case under Title VII. The female prison matrons
argued that they should be allowed to prove that some of the
difference in the prison wage scale was due to intentional sex
discrimination even though their jobs admittedly were not
equal to the jobs of their male counterparts.2 9 There had been
sharp disagreement on whether the EPA's equal work stan-
dard applies to Title VII claims.
A. Pre-Gunther Interpretatins of the Bennett
Amendment
The five to four decision in Gunther reflects the conflicting
administrative and judicial interpretations0 of the meaning of
the Bennett Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 au-
thorized the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to investigate discrimination complaints under Title
VII and, if necessary, to bring suits in federal court.3 1 The ini-
tial EEOC interpretations of the Bennett Amendment clearly
indicate that it considered the equal work standard of the
EPA to be applicable to sex-based wage discrimination claims
under Title VII. In a guideline issued in 1965, the EEOC
stated that it interpreted the Bennett Amendment to mean
that the standard of equal pay for equal work set forth m the
EPA was applicable to Title VII.32
28. See IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Fitzger-
ald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
616 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1980). The EPA permits unequal compensation between males
and females if the unequal compensation is paid pursuant to a seniority system, a
merit system, a quantity or quality of production based compensation system, or a
factor other than sex. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). For relevant text of this pro-
vision, see note 11 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
30. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
32. The applicable language is: "The standards of 'equal pay for equal work' set
[Vol. 65:269
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Since the issuance of the 1965 guidelines, however, the
EEOC has reversed itself, stating that the sex discrimination
provisions of Title VII are coextensive with the provisions
contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 The EEOC's last
pre-Gunther guideline did not discuss whether the equal work
standard of the EPA applied to Title VII.3 4
Lower courts also have rendered inconsistent and conflict-
ing interpretations of the Bennett Amendment. Like those of
the EEOC, the lower courts' initial interpretations construed
the Bennett Amendment to restrict the scope of Title VII by
the equal work standard. In Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son,
Inc.,5 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
duties of a female head of an accounting department were not
substantially equal to those of male department heads, and
dismissed the claim because Title VII required proof of per-
formance of equal work for unequal compensation.3 6
In Ammons v. Zia Co.,37 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit rejected a claim of sex discrimination under Ti-
tle VII because the plaintiff's male counterparts not only had
better credentials but also had more responsibilities. The
court held that the claimant did not establish a prima facie
case because she did not prove a differential in pay based on
the performance of equal work.38
Later cases went in the other direction.3 9 In IUE v. West-
rnghouse Electric Corp.,4 ° the petitioners in a Title VII action
claimed that their employer had, over several decades, paid
lower wages to those job classifications which were predomi-
nantly filled by women. The lower court denied the claim be-
cause the petitioners admittedly did not meet the equal work
standard required by the Bennett Amendment.4 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, and held that the
forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in com-
pensation are applicable to Title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1966).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1981).
35. 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
36. Id. at 171.
37. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
38. Id. at 120.
39. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
41. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979).
1981]
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Bennett Amendment did not authorize explicit discrimination
in compensation.4 2 The court concluded that Title VII was ap-
plicable to sex-based wage discrimination claims without a
satisfaction of the equal pay standard."
The early foundation for the decision in Gunther was the
judicial acceptance of the notion that the Bennett Amend-
ment did not restrict Title VII to only those claims that could
be brought under the Equal Pay Act.44 In Los Angeles Dept.
of Water & Power v. Manhart,45 female employees were re-
quired to pay more than male employees into a pension fund
on the basis of actuarial tables which demonstrated that wo-
men had longer life spans than men. The Court held that the
longevity factor was based solely on sex, and thus the EPA's
fourth affirmative defense - a practice based on any factor
other than sex - did not sanction the employer's discrimina-
tory practice. 46 The Court noted that the Bennett Amend-
ment extended the EPA's four affirmative defenses to all
forms of compensation covered by Title VII.47
B. County of Washington v Gunther
The Gunther decision resolved the issue of whether the
Bennett Amendment required a claimant to meet the EPA's
equal work standard in order to establish a Title VII sex-
based wage discrimination case. The majority held that the
amendment did not carry over the EPA's equal work standard
to Title VII actions.48
Gunther concerned two major areas of dispute. First, both
the majority and minority opinions examined in great detail
the language and legislative history of the Bennett Amend-
ment. The majority interpreted the Bennett Amendment's use
of the word "authorized" to denote affirmative enabling ac-
tion, and thus did not limit the scope of Title VII to only
42. 631 F.2d at 1107.
43. Id.
44. This is contrary to several prior decisions. See text accompanying note 27
supra.
45. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
46. Id. at 712-13 & n.24.
47. Id. at 712 & n.23.
48. County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2254 (1981).
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those claims that could be brought under the EPA.49 The only
wage practices which the Bennett Amendment affirmatively
"authorized" were those practices that fell under the Equal
Pay Act's four affirmative defenses. 50
The dissent argued that the Bennett Amendment could
not refer merely to the EPA's four affirmative defenses be-
cause the first three affirmative defenses already were specifi-
cally included in Title VII; and the fourth defense - discrim-
ination based on factors other than sex - was implied. The
dissent considered the majority's narrow interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment to render it "redundant and superflu-
ous. 51 The majority countered that the redundancy reduced
the possibility of inconsistent interpretations of Title VII
defenses.2
The majority and minority opinions differed in their re-
spective constructions of the amendment's legislative history.
The dissent found that the statements made by Senator Ben-
nett before and after the passage of his amendment clearly
implied that he intended the equal work standard to apply to
Title VII. The majority decided that because the relevant leg-
islative history was contradictory, it could not be considered
an important factor in the decision. 3 The dissent argued,
however, that Senator Bennett's use of the term "provisions"
in his comment that, "[t]he purpose of my amendment is to
provide that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall
not be nullified .. ,"5 clearly referred to both the EPA's
four defenses and the equal work standard.5 The majority felt
that Senator Bennett considered the amendment merely a
technical amendment and the term "provisions" referred only
to the EPA's administrative interpretations and enforcement
49. Id. at 2247-48.
50. Id. at 2252. For an application of the EPA's affirmative defenses to Title VII
sex discrimination claims see Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702 (1978); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2263.
52. Id. at 2259.
53. Id. at 2251 n.16. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals m IUE v. Westinghouse,
631 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1980), noted that "the legislative materials on the Ben-
nett Amendment are remarkable only for their equivocacy and turbidity."
54. 110 CONG. REc. 13647 (1964).




The dissent also cited Senator Bennett's comment one
year after the enactment of Title VII, when he stated that the
amendment was intended to mean that a sex-based wage dis-
crimination claim did not violate Title VII unless it also vio-
lated the EPA.57 Sex-based wage discrimination which did not
satisfy the equal work standard would not violate the EPA.
The majority, however, said it was hesitant to give much
weight to statements made after the passage of legislation.58
Rather than relying on the Bennett Amendment's lan-
guage and legislative history, the majority based its decision
on the broad remedial purpose behind both the EPA and Ti-
tle VII 5 9 The Court interpreted Title VII to prohibit all prac-
tices, in whatever form, which create inequality in employ-
ment due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex
or national origin.60
The majority's argument was strengthened by its prior
broad interpretation of the EPA in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan."' In Corning, the Court stated that the EPA was
broadly remedial and should be construed to fulfill the under-
lying purposes which Congress sought to achieve. 2 The major-
ity's interpretation of both statutes as being broadly remedial
indicated that any exceptions between them would be nar-
rowly construed.
The dissent argued that because the EPA applied only to
claims of sex-based wage discrimination, and Title VII applied
to all forms of discrimination, the doctrine of in pan
matena 5 applied. The dissent reasoned that the provisions of
56. Id. at 2250.
57. Id. at 2260.
58. Id. at 2251 n.16.
59. Id. at 2252-53.
60. Id. at 2253. In framing its interpretation of the overall purpose of Title VII,
the Court cited Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) and Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
61. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
62. Id. at 195.
63. The doctrine of in pan materia generally holds "that a statute dealing with a
narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute cov-
ering a more generalized spectrum. 'Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a
specific statute will not be nullified by a general one regardless of the priority of
enactment.'" Radjanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)(quoting
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).
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the more specific legislation, the EPA, should apply 64 Al-
though the majority did not specifically address the issue of in
part materia, it appeared the majority did not consider the
doctrine applicable to conflicting remedial legislation. The
majority's argument is supported by the Court's prior state-
ment that remedies for employment discrimination should
supplement each other and not be construed so as to ignore
the differences among them.65
Thus, the majority relied on the broad remedial purpose
behind both the EPA and Title VII in holding that interpreta-
tions of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a
remedy without clear congressional mandate must be
avoided."'
C. After Gunther
In Gunther, both the majority and the dissent considered
the decision to address a very narrow issue. The majority em-
phasized that the decision concerned only the effect of the
Bennett Amendment on Title VII claims and did not involve
the comparable worth concept.17 The dissent agreed and
noted that the narrow holding was Gunther's saving feature. 8
It is unlikely, however, that the effects of Gunther will be lim-
ited to the narrow fact situation involved in Gunther where
guidelines suggested by internal company surveys have been
intentionally ignored. For instance, a claim of intentional dis-
crimination based upon an employer's policy which sets lower
wages for jobs predominantly filled by women, which jobs
have equal or greater standing in the employer's job ranking
system than jobs filled by men, can now be made without
showing that the jobs were substantially equal.69 In addition,
a court may consider a claim which establishes that jobs were
intentionally or unintentionally segregated by sex, resulting in
lower wages to the clamant.7 0
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
65. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2252.
67. Id. at 2246.
68. Id. at 2255.
69. This was the factual situation of IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d
1094 (3d Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
70. For an extensive discussion and debate on the merits and elements of a Title
19811
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It is also clear that while Gunther did not endorse the
"comparable worth theory," it did not reject it either. The
majority in Gunther noted that in a claim based on the com-
parable worth theory, the petitioner would claim discrimina-
tion based on a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty
of his or her job with that of other jobs in the same organiza-
tion or community 71 In Christensen v. Iowa72 and Lemons v.
Denver,73 discrimination claims based on the comparable
worth of different jobs were denied because the courts ruled
that Title VII did not provide a remedy for such claims. Gun-
ther, however, has eliminated the EPA's equal work standard,
which was required and not satisfied in Christensen and
Lemons.
Moreover, it can be argued that Gunther's application of
the broad remedial purpose of Title VII can be extended to
permit comparable worth claims. This reasoning would be es-
pecially applicable where the facts indicate that there exists
such an extensive disparity in salary between jobs of relatively
equal worth that the disparity is more likely than not caused
by sex discrimination.7 4
Potential claims based on the comparable worth theory
have received additional support from a report issued by the
National Academy of Sciences. 5 The extensive study found
that women are systematically underpaid, and concluded that
the comparable worth theory merits consideration as a means
for ending sex-based wage discrimination. With Gunther's re-
moval of the equal work standard, the likelihood of successful
Title VII claims based on comparable worth theories is
increased.
It should be noted that Gunther did not render the EPA
VII claim based on segregation by sex, see Survival of a Theory, supra note 7; Blum-
rosen, supra note 9; Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 12. See also Spelfogel,
Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Value: A New Concept, 32 LAB. L.J. 30 (1981).
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2246.
72. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
73. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
74. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), where
the Court stated that a "prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors [sex discrimination]," (citing
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Watees, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
.75. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 9.
[Vol. 65:269
ANTITRUST LAW
useless. 71 Employees who feel they have been subjected to sex-
based wage discrimination and can meet the equal work stan-
dard should consider a claim under the EPA. An advantage of
bringing a claim under the EPA is its two-year statute of limi-
tations, or three years where there is a willful violation,7 com-
pared to Title VII's general 180-day limitation. 8 In addition,
under the EPA an employee can proceed directly against the
employer, whereas under Title VII the employee must go
through the EEOC or a state agency charged with enforcing
fair employment laws.79
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Gunther decision, plaintiffs can now es-
tablish a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination
without showing that they performed work substantially equal
to that performed by members of the opposite sex who re-
ceived higher wages. The Court's narrow construction of the
Bennett Amendment was consistent with its recognition of
the broad remedial purpose of both the EPA and Title VII.
Although it is uncertain how far courts will go in extending
Title VII claims, based on the Court's reliance on the well-
settled view that Title VII is aimed at negating all forms of
discrimination, the courts have a clear rationale to extend
those causes of action far beyond the defunct equal work
standard.
MICHAEL J. BENNET
ANTITRUST LAW - Contribution - Contribution
Between Joint Tortfeasors Denied Under Federal
Antitrust Laws. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981). The United
States Supreme Court recently attempted to resolve the con-
76. This position is contrary to that of the dissent. 101 S. Ct. at 2263.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200ee-5(e) (1976).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a-d) (1976). For a discussion of the procedures for bring-
ing a sex discrimination suit, see B. Hall, P Horowitz & C. Dupree, The Role of
Federal Government in Eliminating Discrimination, in NIN'H NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON WOMEN AND THE LAW: WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOURCE BOOK 182 (1978); A. BAB-
COCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, 368-75, 498-504 (1973).
